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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he became the fifth British prime minister to occupy the role in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this represented unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth prime minister in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for many years – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: ever since Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – the left, the far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.

Simultaneously, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and deficit are now almost twice the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the next day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were early elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look grim.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would lose seats, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that transformation will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”